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Nations do not conduct warfare in the same manner as all other nations that they may go 
to war against or with. A nation may share general characteristics of warfare with other nations, 
but every nation is made up of different components. Some nations will have more of a particular 
type of resource, others will specialize in a particular kind of warfare, and the culture of the 
people may drive them towards a particular style of warfare. Another way nations differ from 
each other is their relationship between their technology and tactics in battle. This paper will 
focus on what the relationship was between England's armor technology and battlefield tactics 
from 1415 to 1515.  
 In order to analyze this relationship, the development of armor throughout 1415-1515 
needs to be understood. Armor has several components that contribute to its effectiveness on the 
battlefield. This paper focuses on the shape of the armor, the metallurgy of the armor, the 
thickness of the armor, and the weight of the armor. The shape of armor will provide insight into 
what the armor was designed to do: what were the designers of the armor trying to get weapons 
to do when the weapons came into contact with the armor. The metallurgical change will show 
the strength of armor from different periods during 1415-1515. With an improvement in 
metallurgy, the thickness and weight of armor can be reduced because it is no longer necessary 
to have so much metal to achieve a similar degree of protectiveness. On the other hand, thickness 
might stay the same or even increase if the designers of armor found it necessary to put more 
steel between the fighter and the weapons used against him. Changes in weight can demonstrate 
how much the fighter valued his mobility and endurance versus increased protection. These 
components then need consideration in relation to changes in tactics on the battlefield.  
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 To determine if there is tactical change in English battles during 1415-1515, the 
components of tactics need analysis. The components of tactics analyzed here are the changes in 
weapons, changes in the composition of the army, changes in the choice of topography, and 
changes in the preference for offense versus defense. Weapons are the thing on the battlefield 
that armor is directly attempting to counter, so changes in weapons or armor will have 
ramifications on each other. A change in the composition of the army, what type of soldier is 
fighting, is important because different types of soldiers have different needs, expose themselves 
to different types of threat, and have to perform different tasks in their armor. A cavalryman does 
not have to use his body the same way an archer does, and the archer does not have to use his 
body in the same way as a dismounted man-at-arms. Where an army chooses to fight has tactical 
implications; different positions provide advantages and disadvantages. Finally, an army 
preferring to be on the offense or defense will expose the soldiers to different kinds of threats 
and demands. A defender does not have to move around the battlefield as much, but an 
individual attacker may be more concerned about delivering the strongest blow possible, which 
could be impeded by armor. Alternatively, by being the attacker, a soldier may expose himself to 
more danger so more protection would be of the utmost importance. These components of 
tactics, when compared with the components of armor, will further the understanding of what 
soldiers valued during 1415-1515.  
  The relationship between armor and battlefield tactics during 1415-1515 England will 
help further the understanding of how humans utilize technology. This paper will look into if 
technology drives battlefield change or if battlefield change drives technology or both. The paper 
will help assess the relative value of trying to use technology to manipulate the battlefield, versus 




 Tobias Capwell’s book Armour of the English Knight 1400-1450 explores the 
development of armor throughout the first half of the fifteenth century. A problem that Capwell 
runs into is the fact that there is not a large collection of surviving armor from this period. 
Capwell’s solution to this problem is the use of effigies of English knights that died throughout 
the period.1 Effigies are the main three-dimensional source for the interpretation of armor that 
has survived to the present day from fifteenth-century England.2 Having a three-dimensional 
representation allows the observer to see how different pieces fit together better. Three 
dimensions can also show more accurately where on the body the armor fit. This solution allows 
Capwell to trace stylistic changes in armor to include the addition of new pieces of armor, the 
changing in the design, which areas are more or less protected, and to see where the pieces are 
designed to move. Another reason why effigies are useful to use is that there is no evidence that 
the sculptors used stock designs; rather, each was uniquely made.3 Effigies are also known to 
have been quite expensive, which leads Capwell to believe that the patrons would want their 
likenesses to be captured accurately.4 
Capwell's premise for why the English would have their own distinctive armor style is 
because the English were tactical trendsetters, so since other armor styles were designed for 
other types of tactics, the English would need their own type of armor.5 To help solidify his 
claim that the English were tactically trendsetters Capwell points out that the English were able 
                                                          
1 Tobias Capwell, Armour of the English Knight: 1400-1450 (Great Britain: Park Communications, 2015), 
8. 
2 Ibid., 30. 
3 Ibid., 43. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
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to defeat the French even when the English were outnumbered.6 In order to understand the 
English change in armor and why it was different from other countries Capwell looked into the 
tactics that the English used versus what other countries use. The Italians, Capwell points out, 
were predominately using shock cavalry troops.7 The English, however, were using archers 
combined with dismounted knights and men-at-arms as their primary tactical unit.8 Capwell 
claims that since these men were fighting on foot, they were using primarily two-handed 
weapons, which would require the men raise their arms above the heads, unlike the shock 
cavalry troop who would be mainly aiming downwards.9  
 Capwell’s work is a wonderful foundation to explore how changes in armor relate to 
changes at the tactical level of war. A limitation of Capwell’s work is that effigies cannot 
provide information on if there was a change in the weight of armor, nor can they be relied upon 
to discover if there was a change in thickness of armor. Effigies cannot be weighed in a useful 
way to tell how armor weight changed, and effigies are made out of stone making all 
measurements for thickness impractical. Also expanding Capwell’s work to the entirety of the 
fifteenth century could show more distinct changes. 
 Alan Williams’ The Knight and the Blast Furnace: A History of the Metallurgy of 
Armour in the Middle Ages & the Early Modern Period is an in-depth look on how metallurgy 
developed and the use of metallurgy in arms and armor throughout Europe. Williams looks into 
how metal was forged into different items for war and how to strengthen metal.10 Williams also 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 20. 
10 Alan Williams, The Knight and the Blast Furnace: A History of the Metallurgy of Armor in the Middle 
Ages & the Early Modern Period (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 877, 893. 
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explores how effective weapons, longbows, crossbows, polearms, swords, axes, and firearms are 
against armor.11 Williams uses both the thickness of armor and metal quality to understand how 
armor progressed over time.12 A weakness of Williams' research is that majority of the armor 
used for thickness is centered on the second half of the sixteenth century. The armor is from 
different locations around Europe, which can be a strength because the general trend is 
observable, but it does not help with the understanding of different tactics from different regions; 
for that the data must split apart. Williams, moreover, is mainly focused on the protective 
capabilities of armor. That consideration must be taken into account in combination with other 
aspects of the functionality of armor in order to improve the overall understanding of the purpose 
of armor design the way it was. 
 Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy’s The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary 
Rose is a tactical exploration of the bow throughout English history. This work is useful because 
of the tactical exploration of key battles throughout the fifteenth century and how the role of the 
bow changed throughout. Strickland and Hardy analyze, among others, the battle of Agincourt, 
the combats of the English civil wars of the fifteenth century, and the battle of Flodden.13 
Strickland and Hardy look at where in the formation the bow is used and what tactics archers 
employed in battle.14 They also look at how armor responded to the development of the bow.15 
Strickland and Hardy's work is extremely useful for the exploration of the question trying to be 
answered throughout this paper. The Great Warbow provides the perspective of people trying to 
defeat armor rather than people trying to improve armor against weapons. Strickland and Hardy 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 936, 945. 
12 Ibid., 913-915, 740. 
13 Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose 
(Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2005), 318, 369, 395. 
14 Ibid., 365. 
15 Ibid., 266. 
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also proved experimental data on the energy delivered and range of different bows. This will 
prove useful against Williams’ research on how effective armor was at stopping or turning 
impacts of different energy levels. 
  Malcom Vale uses the development of arms and armor to better understand changes on 
the battlefield in his book War and Chivalry. By understanding how the battlefield changes, Vale 
is able to better understand the change in war and changes in chivalry.16 Vale provides an 
overview of changes in fifteenth-century warfare in Europe. Vale focuses on the changes in the 
weight of armor throughout the fifteenth century to describe the technological change and has a 
useful table that demonstrates those changes.17 He also draws the connection between changes in 
the weight of armor and different tactical choices made by different countries.18  
Synthesizing the different elements of the analysis presented by each of these authors will 
produce a better understanding of the role armor had on the tactical changes on the English 
battlefield during 1415-1515. Capwell provides a way to use effigies and armor changing armor 
styles to understand how the English preferred to fight in the first half of the fifteenth century. 
Williams demonstrates the importance of metallurgy and thickness is in making armor more 
effective against the weapons of the day. Strickland and Hardy explain the tactics of the English 
during the fifteenth century, and the role bows played it. By focusing on the bow Strickland and 
Hardy provide a different perspective on armor, that is how to defeat the changes in armor. Vale 
uses changes in armor to understand how cultural changes in the medieval world occurred and 
how different countries attitudes created a different style of fighting. Bringing these methods 
                                                          
16 Malcom Vale, War, and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy 
at the End of the Middle Ages (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1981), 100. 
17 Ibid., 184-185. 
18 Ibid., 121. 
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together and focusing on the English during 1415-1515, a better understanding of the 
relationship of tactics and technology will emerge. 
METHODOLOGY: 
In order to gain understanding the relationship between changes in armor and changes in 
tactics in English warfare during 1415-1515, the timelines of changes of both armor and tactics 
need to be understood. The first timeline is that of armor during 1415-1515; the second timeline 
is that of tactics during 1415-1515. The timelines of both armor and tactics need to have several 
subcategories in order to gain an understanding of what, if anything, is changing. Armor needs to 
be broken down into the categories of the shape of the armor, the metallurgy of the armor, the 
thickness of the armor, and the weight of the armor. Tactics need to be broken down into the 
categories of the changes in weapons, changes in the composition of the army, changes in the 
choice of topography, and changes in the preference of offense versus defense. The categories 
that need examination are known the manner in which to examine them must be understood. The 
armor categories will be examined first and then move to the armor categories.  
The armor categories need examination in several different methods. The shape of armor 
will be examined using Capwell’s technique of examining effigies and continuing his 
examination through the year 1500 A.D. The key is here is find additions or subtractions to 
armor styles. Williams’ work will enable the tracking of the hardness of armor. I will examine 
changes in thickness mainly based on a selection of armor, helmets, and breastplates, from the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art that date from different periods throughout the fifteenth century. I 
measured each piece of armor in a multitude of places. The helmets were measured above the 
right and left eye, right and left temple, and the back of the head. The breastplates were measured 
over the heart, the left side of the breastplate, and the bottom right (covering the stomach region). 
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This method was necessary because few historians or curators have made such measurements in 
the past, especially for fifteenth-century pieces.  However, I will supplement my measurements 
with data provided by other scholars to the greatest extent possible. The weight of armor uses the 
information from the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Wallace Collection. The downside to 
examining the pieces from these museums is that they are not purely English pieces; they are 
from all over Europe. However, they will provide a general trend in how the thickness and 
weight of armor changed over time.   
The tactical categories need examination in three different battles for the English. The 
three battles are Agincourt (English versus French, October 25, 1415), Towton (York versus 
Lancaster, March 29,1461), Flodden (English versus Scots, September 9, 1513).  In each of these 
battles, the weapons that the English use, as well as those used against them, will be examined. 
The goal is to see if there is a significant change in the weapons used to defeat the enemy. Then 
changes in the composition of the army will be examined. This category includes how much of 
each type of soldier is included in the army, where those different types of soldiers arrayed on 
the battlefield. The choice of topography for the battle will be examined. This section will 
include topics such as weather, ground conditions, elevation, and natural obstacles. The final 
category for tactics is the preference for offense or defense. This will be determined by pre-battle 
actions, actions during the battle, and responses to enemy action.  
 
ANALYSIS OF ARMOR: 
Capwell’s effigies analysis will start the examination of armor changing over the fifteenth 
century. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, English helmets were bascinets with 
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aventails.19 A mail aventail is a piece of mail that is worn under a helmet, particularly helmets 
that stop at the jawline, which is meant to protect the neck and upper shoulders. For a reference 
look at the picture below, the figure on the right is wearing an aventail. This method maximized 
the flexibility in the neck while still protecting the neck from slashes. The English also wore 
cuirasses with some flexibility built into the sides.20 They also had full arm and leg protection 
with “small side-wings.”21 These side-wings would protect the inner elbow and knee. Their 
gauntlets had short cuffs and an hourglass appearance.22 This period also has a mail skirt to 
protect the upper legs.23  
                                                          
19 Capwell, Armour, 56. 
20 Ibid., 56. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  




Within the first ten years of the century, the English added besagews, oval plates, to 
protect the shoulder joints.25 The snout on the bascinet had become rounder, and the mail 
aventail was replaced with a plate aventail.26 These plate aventails were “composed of hoop-like 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 3. 




plate, producing a more rigid defense which yet provides a similar level of mobility.”27 The 
cuirass skirt adds a triangular piece of metal to protect the groin.28 On the legs and arms, the 
side-wings are replaced with rondels, round disks of metal larger than the side-wings.29 This 
change demonstrates that the English needed additional protection at their joints when they were 
fighting. The English were also concerned about flexibility as can be seen in the plate aventail. 
Instead of creating a solid aventail they still incorporate an element of flexibility. 
The English make further adjustments to the bascinet after the second decade. A plate of 
metal extended down from the helmet to cover the front and back of the neck.30 Mail makes 
another appearance to go under the new neck plate, it also extends to the shoulders.31 This 
suggests that the hoop system was not working well enough to prevent attacks to the throat. The 
backplate of the cuirass is now a solid piece, the backplate used to be three separate pieces 
latched together, and is hinged to the breastplate.32 Having the backplate riveted together 
provides greater security and stability as opposed to having the backplate strapped together. 
Following the third decade, Capwell finds that the bascinet continues to become more 
rounded and that the neck plate is starting to shape more for the chin and throat.33 The cuirass 
skirt extends all the way to mid-thigh and “tassests [are] introduced as narrow, oblong plates 
strapped to the front and sides” of the skirt.34 These indicate that the English developed a 
growing need to protect a larger portion of their legs beyond what a single piece of plate on the 
thigh could provide. The besagews became fluted, similar to ridges running the length of the 




30 Ibid., 64. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 




piece, and concave.35 There is also much less exposed mail worn; the only areas where mail is 
the first line of defense is the inner elbow and knee.36 
In the final decade that Capwell examines, 1440-1450, the cuirass skirt is shortened, but 
the tasset is extended effectively cover the same amount of area.37 The majority of the armor has 
become fluted at this point in development, in some areas, there are diagonally fluted instead of 
vertically.38 On both the legs and arms the rondels have been replaced with large side-wings.39  
 The effigies from England after 1450 are rather scarce. I was able to only find two from the 
1460s and one from 1484.40 To supplement the lack of English effigies I will also use effigies 
from other European countries of the period. The effigies from the 1460s show that the English 
removed the tasset and extended the length of the cuirass skirt to the mid-thigh. This is similarly 
done in both Scotland and Germany during the 1460s and 1470s.4142 For the shoulders there is 
contradicting evidence for whether there are rondels or not, seeing as how both before and after 
the rondels are not included, I believe the inclusion of rondels to be an exception rather than the 
rule for the 1460s. The German effigies still show the use of rondels, but the Scottish does not. 
For the elbows there are either the wings as before or the rondels, most likely the rondels. For the 
effigy from 1484, the major change is that the cuirass skirt is shortened to the upper thigh, but it 
also lacks the tasset. The German armor appears to have something like a tasset, but it is still 
much shorter than in earlier decades supporting the trend of shortening the cuirass skirt.43 Both 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 200. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “Effigies & Brasses,” Effigies and Brasses, accessed May 3, 2018, 
http://effigiesandbrasses.com/search/?year=1451&year_end=1500&tags=&institution=&name=.  
41 Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2923/2480/. 
42 Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/1215/1277/, http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2924/2481/. 
43 Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2929/2486/. 
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of these periods seem to be following the armor design from the last decade Capwell described 
except for the removal of the tasset. There are two reasons why they may have removed them. 
The first being that the tasset may have gotten in the way while they were fighting. The second 
explanation is that the quality of their leg armor improved, so the extra layer of metal became 
redundant. A general trend cannot be established here because there are too few sources of 
effigies after 1450.  
The most detailed information available for the fifteenth century Williams provides is the 
hardness of Innsbruck armor. The armor pieces that he looks at are dated from 1450 to 1500. 
Williams measures the Vickers hardness (VPH) levels of 14 different pieces of armor. The 
earliest piece has an oddly high VPH level, but generally as the years progress the average VPH 
level increases.44 In 1460 the VPH level was 209 and by 1490 the VPH level around 381. 
 
As the years progressed the hardness of armor got higher. This provides greater protection for 
combatants in battle. There is a lack of armor from the earlier periods, but it seems that there is a 
                                                          






















steady progression upwards on the hardness of armor. This would indicate that trying to increase 
armor hardness was a constant effort rather than a direct response to anything. 
The thickness of helmets was tracked in for different locations, the right eye, left eye, left 
temple, right temple, and the back of the helmet. The thickness above the left eye is relatively the 
same in the 1440s and 1490s. 
 
In the 1470s the thickness is almost triple than either of the other two periods. This could be 
because the hardness of the material improved from 1470 to 1490 so it was not as necessary to 
put as much material into the helm, making it lighter and cheaper. The hardness from 1470 to 
1490 improved by 2.5 times. The weight of helmets, as will be explored more later corresponds 
to the increase in thickness. The 1470 has the second highest weights of 154 ounces, that is about 
a doubling in weight from the 1390s. However, more samples need to found and measured to see 




















 For the temple area the pattern is the same, but instead of being three times as thick, the helmet 























































On the back of the helmet, the thickness has a slight decreases but is relatively stable throughout 
the decades.  
 
An explanation for this could be that combatants were not getting attacked in the back of the 
head so armorers took out the extra material so that the overall helmet would be lighter. Many of 
Capwell’s explanations for changes in armor is that the new design provided greater flexibility 
while adding protection. Having a lighter helmet would play into this idea. 
The thickness of breast and backplates were measured in three areas, over the heart, on 
the left side, and on the bottom right of the armor. The thickness over the heart appears to 

































53.138.4 29.150.68 29.150.68 29.158.155 53.138.1 29.158.143 48.149.32 2014.154 2014.673
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However, after 1490 the average thickness decreases again by about twenty percent. A similar 
explanation to that of helmets seems to be reasonable in this circumstance as well. The thickness 
of armor on the left side decreases at a steady rate from 1470 to 1500,starting at 1.6 millimeters 
and decreasing to 0.7 millimeters. Williams provides a system to evaluate the effectiveness of 
armor. Williams’ formula is 𝐸 =
80∗𝑇∗𝑇∗𝑊
𝐶𝑜𝑠 𝐴
.45 E is the energy in defeat armor, T is the thickness of 
armor, W is the coefficient of the quality of armor, and A is the angle of attack. If it is assumed 
that the armor of 1.6 millimeters has the worst quality of armor and the armor of 0.7 millimeters 
has the best quality of armor, as well as the angle is 45 degrees, then it is revealed that the 1.6 
millimeter armor takes 144.815 joules and the 0.7 millimeter armor takes 83.156 joules. Since it 
does not make sense for the effectiveness of armor to go down then a conclusion for this part of 
armor could be that the left side of the body became a less of a concern as time progressed. So, 
instead of putting material in area that is not important the armor design decided to put the 
material in the area that was more important, over the heart for example, while still maintaining 
the same weight. 
The thickness at the bottom right of armor has a similar pattern, as over the heart, a general 
                                                          
























increase up to 1490 then there is a decrease in thickness. 
 
The weight of armor is the next portion of armor design that needs to be discussed. The 
weight of helmets from 1390-1510 had a general pattern of increase in weight: 
starting in 1390 at a weight of 61 ounces and ending in 1510 at 175 ounces. In 1490, there is a 
significant drop in weight only to rise again in 1510. This pattern of weight generally aligns with 






















































The breast and backplate weights remain fairly constant throughout the decades. In 1510, there is 
an increase of about 70 ounces. This pattern does not perfectly align with the thickness.  
 
ANALYSIS OF TACTICS: 
The weapons used at Agincourt, October 25, 1415, by the English are longbows, axes, 
maces, swords, spears, falcon beaks, mallets, and stakes.46 The French at Agincourt did not use 
longbows; instead, their archers used crossbows as well as more conventional bows that were not 
as powerful as the longbow.47 The longbow enabled the English to disrupt and stall all of the 
French actions.48 The English men-at-arms primarily fought with long spears.49 The French 
dismounted men-at-arms also primarily fought with spears.50 
                                                          
46 Anne Curry, Agincourt: A New History (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2006), 255. 
47 Peter Reid, Medieval Warfare: Triumph and Domination in the Wars of the Middle Ages (New York: 
Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), 273. 
48 Ibid., 334. 
49 Ibid., 859-860. 

















53.138.4 Met 53.138.1 W.C.L., A.21 29.150.69 29.150.68 48.149.32
Met 29.158.155 29.158.143 2014.673 W.C.L., A.22 2014.154
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At Towton, March 29, 1461, both sides used a combination of swords, poleaxes, 
halberds, axes, and longbows.51 The poleaxe was the preferred staff weapon at Towton.52 At 
Agincourt, the preferred weapon for the dismounted English men-at-arms was a spear. The 
poleaxe is both swung and thrust, thus exposing more areas of the body in its use. The longbow 
as at Agincourt was the initial weapon used. Unlike at Agincourt, the longbow was being used 
against fellow Englishmen rather than the French. Also at Agincourt, the fact that the English 
had longbows and the French did not played a significant role. Now that both sides have the 
longbow, the deciding factor was who utilized the weapon better along with utilizing other 
factors at the battle.  
The battle at Flodden, September 9, 1513, had the major shift in weaponry of the 
cannon.53 The cannon was able to reach farther than the longbow, so for the first time in this 
examination, the cannon is the first weapon armies had to worry about. The English had smaller 
field cannons than the Scots allowing the English to maneuver the guns more effectively than the 
Scots.54 The English also used the eight-foot bill instead of the longer pike of the Scots.55 The 
English archers had a short sword and buckler to supplement their longbows. 
In all three battles the longbow played a critical role for the English; it helps them to attrit 
and disrupt their enemies to the point that their melee weapons could dispatch the rest of the 
enemy. The biggest differences in weapons used in battle are that at Agincourt when the archers 
joined in, they used any weapon they could get ahold of and the men-at-arms used lances. The 
                                                          
51Philip A Haigh, The Military Campaigns of the Wars of the Roses (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton 
Publishing Limited, 1995), 62. 
52 Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, and Christopher Knusel ed., Blood Red Roses: The archaeology of a 
mass grave from the Battle of Towton AD 1461 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2000), 150. 
53George Goodwin, Fatal Rivalry: Flodden 1513 Henry VIII, James IV and the Battle for Renaissance 
Britain (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) , 197. 
54 Ibid., 198-199. 
55 Ibid., 204. 
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English men-at-arms evolve their staff weapons from the lance at Agincourt to the poleaxe at 
Towton, and finally to the bill at Flodden. Towton has the biggest change in weaponry; for melee 
weapons, they primarily used poleaxes instead of lances. 
The composition of the English army at Agincourt was around 5,000 archers and 900 
men-at-arms.56 The archers were arrayed on the flanks of the men-at-arms.57 There was also a 
contingent of archers that either started in front of the men-at-arms and pulled back as the French 
approached, or that took up position in the middle of the English men-at-arms.58 The men-at-
arms were arrayed into a single line for battle.59 The archers had stakes that they placed in a 
checkerboard fashion in front of their position to protect themselves from advancing French 
troops.60 Also, when the archers started to join the melee they did not do so on an individual 
initiative, but rather as a cohesive unit.61 
                                                          
56 Strickland, The Great Warbow, 325. 
57 Curry, Agincourt, 235. 
58 Curry, Agincourt, 252. and Strickland, The Great Warbow, 327. 
59 Strickland, The Great Warbow, 327. 
60 Ibid., 326.  




At the battle of Towton, both the Lancastrian and Yorkist forces were arrayed similarly to 
each other. They each had their men-at-arms in three lines, the third being the rearguard and 
reserve commanded by the leader of each army.63 The Yorkists had their archers in front of their 
men-at-arms until the Lancastrian forces got too close, then the archers fell behind the men-at-
arms.64 Neither side had a cavalry force.  
                                                          
62 Reid, Medieval Warfare, 279. 
63 Haigh, The Military Campaigns, 60. 




  The English army at Flodden was made up of 26,000 men. These 26,000 men were split 
between Surrey and his son the Admiral. Surrey controlled the rearguard, his center had 5,000 
men, his right wing was composed of 1,500 mounted troops and 1,500 men on foot, and on the 
left wing was 3,000 men. The Admiral was with the vanguard; his center had 9,000 men, his left 
and right wing had 3,000 men each.66 This is the first battle in this analysis where the English 
have a mounted reserve component. This mounted reserve component was used to reinforce the 
English from the initial pike advance of the Scots by joining the breaking English formation, thus 
allowing the English to continue to fight.  
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  The biggest change in the composition of the armies of the English during the fifteenth 
century is the percentage of archers used in the battles. At Agincourt, the overwhelming 
percentage of men were archers; out of about 6,000 men, only 900 were men-at-arms, making 
the archers about 85 percent of the army. At the battle of Towton, the number of archers is not 
given, but Philip A. Haigh claims that the Lancastrians had 40,000 men-at-arms and the Yorkists 
had 36,000 men-at-arms.68 Peter Reid claims that these numbers are too large and calculates the 
number of men on both sides by counting the number of nobles and averaging the number of 
men each would have and the number of additional forces that could be brought in from the 
surrounding areas.69 Reid calculates that the Lancastrians would have 27,000 men total and the 
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Yorkists would have 22,000.70 Reid believes the breakdown of the Lancastrian army to be “about 
2,500 men-at-arms, some 12,500 archers and around 12,000 bill-men, while the Yorkists would 
have had about 2,000 men-at-arms, 11,000 archers and 9,000 bill-men.”71 Haig's numbers seem 
to be high, especially since he says his numbers are for men-at-arms only. Using Reid's 
breakdown of the army it can be determined that the archers make up 46 percent of the 
Lancastrian army and 50 percent of the Yorkist army. By the time of Flodden the artillery piece 
had taken over the primary role of the longbow so it would seem likely that there would be even 
fewer archers at that battle than at Towton. The primary role of the longbow, as seen at 
Agincourt and Towton, was to strike the enemy at far distance and force the enemy to fight or 
flee as well as disrupt the enemy during their advance. A constant similarity is that the English 
fought on foot on all of these battles; Flodden was the only battle with mounted troops and they 
were only about 6 percent of the army and the majority of the fighting was done by men on foot. 
 Topography at Agincourt from the English perspective was highly useful. The English 
were positioned at the bottom of a long gentle incline, which is usually a disadvantage, but the 
English were able to turn it into an advantage.72 The ground at Agincourt was extremely soft and 
slippery since it was a newly sown wheat field.73 The soft ground also made it easier for the 
archers to put in the stakes to defend their position.74 The English flanks, where the archers were 
positioned, was against a thick tree line.75 This prevented the French from attacking the archers 
from the archers’ flanks. The more French troops and cavalry that attack, the more of a quagmire 
the ground become for the advancing French, making it almost impossible for them to advance 
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even reasonably quickly.76 The English would have also been fighting on the rather muddy 
ground. However, it would not be as large of a drawback for them since the English were 
holding their ground instead of trying to take it. This experience could lead to the English 
accepting armor that weighed more so that it could provide more protection while fighting in 
place. Alternatively, they might recognize that they may need to advance through the mud in the 
future and need to make sure that their legs are not restricted as much as possible.  
 Lancastrian and Yorkist forces were separated by a shallow valley at the beginning of the 
battle at Towton.77 One of the armies was going to have to go downhill and then back uphill to 
fight their enemy. There was also extremely high winds that were blowing snow into the face of 
the Yorkist forces.78 When the wind flipped directions the Yorkists opened with longbow fire; 
the wind carried the arrows farther than they would have gone otherwise and when the 
Lancastrians shot back, their arrows fell short of the Yorkist lines.79 When the Yorkists 
eventually pushed the Lancastrians back, the Lancastrians slipped and got trampled trying to go 
up the snow-covered hill they originally came down.80 Many Lancastrians as they fled tried to 
cross the River Cock and drowned because their armor weighed too much for them.81 
Seizing Branxton Hill was the decisive objective for the English at Flodden that would 
enable the English to defeat the Scots. In order to do that the English had to cross the River 
Till.82 The river was swollen from heavy rains previously.83 The English also crossed the river at 
two points that were a mile and half apart, because they needed to get the army across as much at 
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the same time as possible and they had to use a specific bridge in order to move the heavy 
cannons across.84 There was a large amount of smoke cover both the English and Scottish 
movements; the smoke came from the burning of the Scots trash as they changed positions to 
react to the English attack on Branxton Hill.85 Also after the first Scottish pike attack, the already 
muddy ground become so bad that men's legs were sinking into it.86 
 In all three battles, the English utilized the elevation of the ground to their advantage. At 
both Agincourt and Flodden, the English set up at the bottom of a hill. At Towton both sides 
were on the top of hills separated by a shallow valley. All three battles were also fought on 
ground that was extremely muddy or slippery. Agincourt and Flodden were both fought in the 
fall, bringing rain, and Towton was fought in late winter, bringing snow. 
 Henry at Agincourt wanted to fight a defensive battle. He built a defensive position and was 
then forced to move out it because he knew that the French would only gain in their number of 
troops and would be able to resupply.87 Henry was not able to resupply unless he was able to get 
past the French. When he did advance, he made sure that his archers brought their stakes with 
them and he only advanced to bowshot range.88 Once he gets his archer into bowshot range, he 
has them fire onto the French until the French are forced to fight or be cut down by arrows. 
Instead of going to meet the French advance he waits for them to come to his men-at-arms and 
uses his archers to thin out and disrupt the French ranks.89 
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 Both sides at the battle at Towton choose to take up positions on a hill, which is the 
classic defensive position.90 The Yorkists fired first only because when the wind shifted, it gave 
them the distinct advantage of being able to hit their enemy without being able to be attacked in 
return.91 The barrage of arrows forced the Lancastrians to either attack or to withdraw from the 
field; they choose to attack.92 The Yorkists, by striking first, forced their enemy to come to them 
where they were already set up in a defensive position. This is very similar to what Henry did to 
the French at Agincourt. The Yorkists were able to hold the Lancastrians off long enough for 
their reinforcements to arrive and then with that advantage of fresh troops were able to drive the 
Lancastrians back and ultimately defeated them.93 
 The English at Flodden were fighting an enemy who was in a better defensive position 
than they were in. The English artillery pieces were more maneuverable and could fire more 
accurately and faster than the Scots could counter, so the Scots were forced to attack the English 
or be torn apart by the English artillery.94 This is continuing the English tactic used at both 
Agincourt and Towton; attack the enemy in order to make them come out of their defensive 
position. The Scots attacked with their pike-men and their first assault was rather successful; 
they almost broke the English entirely and would have done so if it were not for the 
reinforcement by the English mounted troops who were able to prevent English forces from 
being overwhelmed.95 After the first assault was repelled, the Scots sent in their second wave of 
pike-men and this assault would have had similar effects and could have destroyed the English 
army if it was not for the mud that was created by the first wave of pike-men. The mud slowed 
                                                          
90 Haigh, The Military Campaigns, 60. 
91 Ibid., 61. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 62-63. 
94 Goodwin, Fatal Rivalry, 191. 
95 Ibid., 200-201. 
Johnson 29 
 
and disrupted their assault and allowed the English longbow-men to start picking them off and 
now that the pike formation had been disrupted, their reach advantage was negated; for pikes to 
be effective they need to be part of a solid formation making it impossible for the enemy to get 
around their blades.96 The Scots now had to get in close and fight in a more individualistic style.  
The English bills were just short enough to be more nimble than the Scottish pikes, but they were 
long enough to outreach the Scots' side-arms.97 This method ultimately defeated the Scots and 
the English routed them. 
 In all three battles, the English did their best to fight a defensive battle. In all three in 
order to get the enemy to go on the offensive, the English struck with long-range weapons that 
the enemy could not counter except by advancing forward for a melee fight. At both Agincourt 
and Flodden, the English were motivated to get the fight started sooner than they may have liked 
because they were running low on supplies and had to fight through the enemy to get 
resupplied.98 
 After examining all four categories of tactics for the fifteenth century English a strong 
theme starts to emerge. There is little change in both the topography and the preference for 
offense or defense. For weapons, the English men-at-arms evolve from wielding the spear 
primarily to the poleaxe to the bill. The enemies of the English for melee evolve from using the 
spear to the poleaxe to the pike. For ranged weapons, the English had to deal with crossbows 
then longbows and finally cannon. As for composition, Agincourt seems to be the outlier with 
such a huge number of archers; in the other two battles, the armies are dominated by men-at-
arms on foot. The changes in the weapons the English used caused an increase in demand for the 
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ability to swing and deliver more powerful strokes as opposed to thrusts. The English armor also 
had to be able to deflect or stop similar blows from harming the English. Changes in armor 
would most likely be in response to these concerns.   
  When examining the four components of armor design, weight, thickness, hardness, and 
design of the armor, there is a consistent manner to the progress. The weight of the helmet 
steadily increases over time, while the weight of the breastplate remains relatively the same. This 
could be from the increase in the use of more dangerous staff weapons. The way to deliver a 
more powerful blow with staff weapon with an axe or hammer on it would be to raise the 
weapon above the head and to bring it down with as much force possible. This would mean the 
first thing to be threatened is the head rather than the chest. The chest would need to primarily 
prevent thrusts from enemies trying to quickly attack while a powerful blow is being prepared. 
The thickness of helmets start and end at the same level (more research should be done here), 
and the thickness in breastplates over the heart region generally rose for the majority of last 
quarter of the century. The hardness of armor also generally increased in the last quarter of the 
century. The design of armor was modified slowly and usually in the same areas, protecting the 
joints better, better protection for the neck, and protection for the upper thigh region increased. 
This would provide the individual soldier with the ability to make more powerful attacks without 
the concern of being wounded in sensitive areas. 
 In addition to the change in weapons in English battles another explanation as to why 
English armor continued to change is that the English were constantly trying to find the best 
armor to suit their tactical needs. This makes sense, instead of drastically altering your 
equipment or your preferred fighting style; it would be easier instead to slowly change the armor 
in specific areas. The English over the century had plenty of battles in which to discover what 
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their needs are on the battlefield for their armor. By not changing tactically, they are able to 
predict what problems they will encounter in battle and so they can adjust accordingly.  
 English armor and English tactics during 1415-1515 adds to the discussion on whether it 
is technology that drives tactics or if it is tactics that drives technology. When focusing on armor, 
I believe that it is the tactics used that drive the technology. The shape of English armor steadily 
adds more protection to areas that are found to have weak spots, such as joints and the neck. The 
weight of English helmets reveal an increase in weight, which corresponds to the prevalence of 
poleaxes and bills. The thickness of the front breastplates increases as the side lessens, most 
likely to maintain the same weight, shows that a certain importance was given to one area over 
another. If it were the technology driving the tactics there would probably be more variation in 
armor design and more visible experimentation on how to design armor. The battles themselves 
would most likely not be consistent in three out of the four categories examined.  
 Armor being a technology that is driven by tactics makes sense. Armor is a defensive 
piece of technology so it is reasonable to be reactive to the situation that it is placed. For a 
technology to drive tactics, it has to make the army attack or defend differently. Armor, in 1415-
1515 England, supplemented the tactics already in use. Armor was changed to meet threats of 
more deadly weapons, to make it easier wield new weapons, or to prolong the wearer’s ability to 
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